The folly of Afghanistan.
All nations have their ways of referring to their glorious, and also inglorious, dead. Those who we often find ourselves sided against prefer "martyrs", or shaheeds. We, on the other hand, like "heroes", and even our supposed neutral news organisations sometimes slip into describing them as such, as ITV did last night. It isn't of course fair to focus on the language used to describe the dead when there is little other way to eloquently express the loss when asked to do soon after being informed of the death of loved ones, but when two soldiers are described in almost exactly the same terms, it also shows the fatuity underlying the deaths. Relatives talked in one case of "pride", as if there was something especially noble in dying for a cause which only just less than half the country believes in.
As ever, the Sun remains the most shameless in its boilerplate depictions of those who have laid down their lives for something which it seems only politicians, newspapers and the usual belligerents can find the words to start to justify. "The magnificent eight" it starts one sentence with, which can only bring to mind the way that al-Muhajiroun described the 9/11 hijackers: the magnificent nineteen. Not that the two groups are in any way comparable, but it remains the case that such hyperbole only does disservice to those who were far more modest about what they did than those wishing to lionise them.
It's worth remembering that although we have been in Afghanistan since October 2001, it was only three and a half years ago that British forces were sent to Helmand, in what has turned out to be one of the most ill-briefed and disastrously commanded missions in recent British military history. Supposedly predicated on reconstruction, then defence secretary John Reid hoped that the 3,300 soldiers deployed would be able to return, job done, without "firing a single shot". Since then around 4 million bullets have been expended. From the very beginning there has been two connected failings: a lack of suitable equipment, and a lack of anywhere near the numbers required to be able to hold the ground that the Taliban is either forced to retreat from or which it gives up, only to return to later. Even now that there are approaching 10,000 troops, having finally withdrawn from Iraq, there are still almost certainly nowhere near enough to be able to convince those who they are supposed to be protecting, the Afghan civilians, that they can vote in the elections in a month's time free from threats.
Combined with this we have a political class that simply cannot even begin to be straight with the British public about why the war is being fought, let alone why it should be fought. The poll for the BBC and Guardian shows that the vast majority know the reasoning for why the war is being fought: 80% saying that it's part of the fight against al-Qaida, 78% helping the Afghan government against the Taliban. The problem with this is that these justifications are facile and only half-true. It begins with the false perception that the Taliban and al-Qaida are one and the same thing; they are not. In 2001 al-Qaida were simply the Taliban's guests, and ones which supposedly some of the main benefactors of the regime. Only when both were pushed out towards the Af-Pak border did the two begin to merge somewhat, forced to band together in order to survive. The emphasis on Iraq allowed both to build themselves back up, hence the situation we are now in. They can still though be separated again, and the more moderate elements of the Taliban can be dealt with.
The biggest lie of all, and one which is comparable to those told about Iraq, is that our presence in Afghanistan prevents terrorism, and that by staying there we prevent al-Qaida from returning. Not only does our presence there in fact increase the threat, just as our role in Iraq increased the threat exponentially, but al-Qaida is of course already there, just as it always has been. It might not have the presence that it had for years in Iraq, and still does to an extent, holding whole provinces and cities, but it is there, and it can still operate with impunity.
As has become ever more clear over the last few years, the real problem is not Afghanistan, it is Pakistan. Pakistan's ISI created the Taliban and only very recently has that support seemed to have finally come to an end. As long as there is another safe haven, both for the Taliban and for al-Qaida over the border, wasting a single drop of blood is a waste of time. It took the Pakistani Taliban moving within 100 miles of Islamabad for the government to finally wholeheartedly launch a campaign which has either seen the group routed, or, more likely, as happened in Iraq and in Afghanistan, merely fallen back so that it can once again engage in guerilla warfare, the only way in which it has a chance of winning.
Yet it is the very weakness of Pakistan as a coherent state that also makes the war in Afghanistan unwinnable. Even though the chances of Pakistan either collapsing or being overrun by Islamic extremists have been vastly exaggerated, if Pakistan cannot have sorted itself out having had 50 years to do so, the possibility of turning a nation which has been at war with itself and invaders for over 30 years, where there are five different ethnic groups, six different languages spoken and whole sectors controlled by warlords and distinct fiefdoms is negligible.
Despite knowing every word of this, our politicians, regardless of party or affiliation, all profess in public that either progress is being made, the war is being won or it can be won. The very least they must do is set out something approaching a strategy which is achievable, whether it's building the Afghan army up until it isn't just renowned for those in its ranks marijuana intake, establishing something like government control over areas which are currently no-go zones, or simply declaring victory in Helmand, even if it isn't close to being won. There has to be honesty, but expecting that from either of the main parties is like waiting for Godot. We owe something to those who have lost their sons and daughters, but once that has been achieved, we simply have to get out.
As ever, the Sun remains the most shameless in its boilerplate depictions of those who have laid down their lives for something which it seems only politicians, newspapers and the usual belligerents can find the words to start to justify. "The magnificent eight" it starts one sentence with, which can only bring to mind the way that al-Muhajiroun described the 9/11 hijackers: the magnificent nineteen. Not that the two groups are in any way comparable, but it remains the case that such hyperbole only does disservice to those who were far more modest about what they did than those wishing to lionise them.
It's worth remembering that although we have been in Afghanistan since October 2001, it was only three and a half years ago that British forces were sent to Helmand, in what has turned out to be one of the most ill-briefed and disastrously commanded missions in recent British military history. Supposedly predicated on reconstruction, then defence secretary John Reid hoped that the 3,300 soldiers deployed would be able to return, job done, without "firing a single shot". Since then around 4 million bullets have been expended. From the very beginning there has been two connected failings: a lack of suitable equipment, and a lack of anywhere near the numbers required to be able to hold the ground that the Taliban is either forced to retreat from or which it gives up, only to return to later. Even now that there are approaching 10,000 troops, having finally withdrawn from Iraq, there are still almost certainly nowhere near enough to be able to convince those who they are supposed to be protecting, the Afghan civilians, that they can vote in the elections in a month's time free from threats.
Combined with this we have a political class that simply cannot even begin to be straight with the British public about why the war is being fought, let alone why it should be fought. The poll for the BBC and Guardian shows that the vast majority know the reasoning for why the war is being fought: 80% saying that it's part of the fight against al-Qaida, 78% helping the Afghan government against the Taliban. The problem with this is that these justifications are facile and only half-true. It begins with the false perception that the Taliban and al-Qaida are one and the same thing; they are not. In 2001 al-Qaida were simply the Taliban's guests, and ones which supposedly some of the main benefactors of the regime. Only when both were pushed out towards the Af-Pak border did the two begin to merge somewhat, forced to band together in order to survive. The emphasis on Iraq allowed both to build themselves back up, hence the situation we are now in. They can still though be separated again, and the more moderate elements of the Taliban can be dealt with.
The biggest lie of all, and one which is comparable to those told about Iraq, is that our presence in Afghanistan prevents terrorism, and that by staying there we prevent al-Qaida from returning. Not only does our presence there in fact increase the threat, just as our role in Iraq increased the threat exponentially, but al-Qaida is of course already there, just as it always has been. It might not have the presence that it had for years in Iraq, and still does to an extent, holding whole provinces and cities, but it is there, and it can still operate with impunity.
As has become ever more clear over the last few years, the real problem is not Afghanistan, it is Pakistan. Pakistan's ISI created the Taliban and only very recently has that support seemed to have finally come to an end. As long as there is another safe haven, both for the Taliban and for al-Qaida over the border, wasting a single drop of blood is a waste of time. It took the Pakistani Taliban moving within 100 miles of Islamabad for the government to finally wholeheartedly launch a campaign which has either seen the group routed, or, more likely, as happened in Iraq and in Afghanistan, merely fallen back so that it can once again engage in guerilla warfare, the only way in which it has a chance of winning.
Yet it is the very weakness of Pakistan as a coherent state that also makes the war in Afghanistan unwinnable. Even though the chances of Pakistan either collapsing or being overrun by Islamic extremists have been vastly exaggerated, if Pakistan cannot have sorted itself out having had 50 years to do so, the possibility of turning a nation which has been at war with itself and invaders for over 30 years, where there are five different ethnic groups, six different languages spoken and whole sectors controlled by warlords and distinct fiefdoms is negligible.
Despite knowing every word of this, our politicians, regardless of party or affiliation, all profess in public that either progress is being made, the war is being won or it can be won. The very least they must do is set out something approaching a strategy which is achievable, whether it's building the Afghan army up until it isn't just renowned for those in its ranks marijuana intake, establishing something like government control over areas which are currently no-go zones, or simply declaring victory in Helmand, even if it isn't close to being won. There has to be honesty, but expecting that from either of the main parties is like waiting for Godot. We owe something to those who have lost their sons and daughters, but once that has been achieved, we simply have to get out.
Labels: Afghanistan, foreign policy, insurgency, jihadists, madness, Pakistan, terror, terrorism
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Great post; but two differences - first I think it is simplistic to say that the ISI 'created' the Taliban. They gave it crucial support and backing but most detailed studies of the Taliban, like Ahmed Rashid's excellent work, indicate that the Taliban grew very much from its organic roots in the refugee community in the NWFP and the ethnic PAshtuns. Indeed on crucial issues the Taliban acted independently and defiantly of the ISI and were eager to demonstrate to Islamabad that they were not under their control.
Secondly, the problem with Pakistan here isn't a lack of capacity to deal with the Taliban but the fact that the Pakistani military's doctrine of strategic depth' vis-a-vis India has required it to exert control over Afghanistan and Kashmir in order to offset its strategic narrowness and to maintain an offensive stance towards India but funding cross-border insurgncy and making sure that its northern border is protected by either having a friendly regime across it or undermining ones that aren't friendly. Until Pakistan reverses this strategy the problem will continue.
Posted by
Conrad Barwa |
Tuesday, July 14, 2009 1:10:00 PM
Good points, thanks.
Posted by
septicisle |
Tuesday, July 14, 2009 9:54:00 PM